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Regen Green Hydrogen · v1.0.0

The same plant, read twice.

Electricity goes in; hydrogen and oxygen come out; heat leaves through the walls. Nothing about that arrangement decides whether the plant helps a place or draws it down. The water, the ground, the power, the heat, the oxygen and the molecule itself each read one way as cost and another as contribution — and the colour word on the press release settles none of them.

One basin · one host covenant · five capitals
What makes this a model

It can fail a project whose marketing has already passed

The page teaches the public arc. The model beneath it carries the refusal, the measured ledger, and the consequence — including the number that says most of these projects will never be built.

01

The refusal

The model will not call a certified-clean molecule leaving an unchanged host regenerative; nor consent held as a process rather than an instrument; nor a carried interest called ownership; nor state equity called community consent; nor a benefit fund with no legally constituted recipient; nor rights anchored only in a grant condition; nor a promise-to-pay closure bond; nor 'empty land'; nor aggregate reassurance on water in either direction; nor an announcement reported as capacity; nor a supply claim that never interrogates the merit of the demand.

02

The shared decision

The water-and-consent covenant: the basin's own institutions — the commons irrigation associations, the tribal governments and their trustee, the domestic-well households inside the drawdown radius, and the state water administrator — together with the host utility and the members who carry its rates, the named offtaker, and the party still liable for the site's cleanup, execute one instrument in which the water right and its curtailment order, the host-load priority, the end use, the closure funding and the withdrawal path are each a number, a measurement and a consequence. No single party can pass this state alone: the developer cannot buy the water, the state cannot consent on behalf of the ditch, the utility cannot promise a molecule it has not contracted, the offtaker cannot fund the closure, and none of them can waive the household's well.

03

The secret sauce

Every hydrogen standard on Earth certifies the molecule. Not one of them asks whether the place ends up better, or whether the people who live there can still stop the project after it is built. This model puts the boundary on the water figure, the lifecycle stage on the capacity figure, the obligor on the closure bond, and a revocation clause in the consent — and then it prints the number that says most of these projects will never be built. It is the only hydrogen framework that can fail a project whose marketing has already passed.

6 movements · one fixed orderRead the telling

The same plant, read twice. The model's full narrative, rendered from its own data, in its own words.

Pathway

A floor that rises on dates already in law

The target is Place-contributing. The floor is Place-neutral. The top rung stays honestly aspirational until a whole operation is verified against the complete model.

Pattern library — how proven is each claim18 patterns total
  1. 01

    Colour-marketed

    Hydrogen sold on a colour or an announcement. No emissions accounting that survives its own boundary, and capacity quoted with no lifecycle stage attached to it.

    Gate to climb · Publish a lifecycle-staged capacity and an emissions figure computed under a named methodology.
    operating
  2. 02

    Certified-clean molecule

    Meets a recognised scheme's emissions threshold with additionality, temporal and geographic correlation. It answers the molecule question completely and the place question not at all.

    Gate to climb · Add an executed consent instrument, reclaimed or effluent water at a declared boundary — or a disclosed, quantified, community-reviewed deviation — and funded third-party closure.
    proposal
  3. 03

    Place-neutral

    The certified molecule plus executed consent, water at a declared boundary, funded third-party closure, a complete published ledger, and a host measurably no worse off than before.

    Gate to climb · Add local ownership at or above the floor, host-load priority in the instrument, and an offtake that belongs to hydrogen.
    proposal
  4. 04

    Place-contributing

    Everything below, plus local ownership at or above the floor, the host electrified first, a merit-tested offtake, revocable consent, and measured ecological improvement against the baseline.

    Gate to climb · Verified positive change across all five capitals, and a recognition event under the unchanged VLAS kernel.
    proposal
  5. 05

    Regenerative anchor

    Verified net-positive across five capitals, sustained through at least one full measure-verify-recognise cycle, with consent still revocable and closure still funded.

    Gate to climb · Aspirational. No operating example exists: nothing in the source register supports an operating tier for a community-owned green-hydrogen asset anywhere, and the largest verified operating electrolyser in it is 14 MW.
    proposal
Source register

Every row here was fetched and read

Regulations, peer-reviewed work, agency records, and the proponent's own filings. A source supports a claim; it does not certify this model. Where two published figures disagree, both are printed disagreeing.

USDA Rural Development / EN Engineering (ENTRUST)

USDA RD Questa Appendices

the only equipment sizing anywhere in the public record: 57 MW electrolyzer, 29-ton hydrogen gas storage, 25 MW fuel cell, 60 MW solar PV array · design maturity is PARTIAL 10% CONCEPTUAL DESIGN SUBMITTAL 12/4/2025 — every hydrogen performance figure is therefore a projection off a 10% design · the 60 MW solar figure told to federal agencies conflicts with the 50 MW figure in every public communication (UNRESOLVED) · site layout legend names LINEAR GENERATORS / FUEL CELLS — the technology class is not settled · NM SHPO correspondence showing Bureau of Indian Affairs consultation for Picuris Pueblo had not been initiated · project coordinates 36.7253 N, -105.6150 W · the federal environmental appendices contain ZERO occurrences of 'acre-feet', 'water right', or the well permit number 14117

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John D'Antonio Jr., P.E., American West Water Advisors (hosted by Kit Carson Electric Cooperative)

Basic Principles of NM Water Rights / Simplified Overview: Water Rights and Community Protections in Questa, NM

the Rio Grande basin is fully appropriated — any new diversion requires transferring an existing valid water right · the Village of Questa does not have adequate water rights to support its current and future needs · acequias hold a statutory consent right: water cannot be moved off an acequia unless the acequia itself agrees · more than 300 acequias are present in the region · Chevron held a significant amount of UNPROVEN water rights; the enabling instrument is a January 2025 Chevron/NMOSE settlement · the hydrogen transfer sought is 100 acre-feet by APPLICATION, not a completed transfer · well RG-14117 POD 18: 530 ft depth, 9.5-inch casing, estimated 600 gpm yield, ~1-mile pipeline to point of use · the proponent's own comparison class for a 47 AF/yr draw is an 18-hole golf course · authored by a former New Mexico State Engineer now advising the proponent — a disclosure the governance gate should require

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GZA GeoEnvironmental d/b/a Glorieta Geoscience (memo to KCEC CEO Luis Reyes)

Questa Hydrogeologic/Visualization Modeling Study — Phase 1 Summary

depth to water at the production well is ~418 ft bgs with a cement and bentonite seal from 415 ft to surface · the finding is 'hydraulic communication is likely dampened' and influence is 'anticipated' to be 'limited' — hedged, NOT 'separate' · 8 wells in the model area are screened at a similar elevation and may have a more direct connection · reduced acequia flows are attributed to below-average precipitation and snowpack — a climate attribution reached BEFORE any pumping test · the study is proponent-commissioned, preliminary, and its findings 'could be modified based on future testing results' · Phase 2 — the 48-hour pumping test and field water-level calibration — had NOT been performed as of 15 June 2026

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GZA / Glorieta Geoscience (Reid Williams, Josh Simpson), for KCEC

Presentation of Visualization Model

the Phase 1 model is a DESK STUDY built from existing records: 957 water right files reviewed, 585 PODs in the model domain, 50 borehole logs imported · no field measurement underlies the water-safety conclusion at the time of publication

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Kit Carson Electric Cooperative

KCEC Downloadable Fact Sheet

the four resident-facing water assurances: a permitted 540-foot well, 250 acre-feet 'legally transferred in 2016', rights 'already adjudicated and approved', a source 'separate from residential wells' · each of those four assurances is unsupported, contradicted, or overstated by the proponent's OWN other publications · the teaching case for testing a marketing assurance against the applicant's own filings

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Kit Carson Electric Cooperative

Kit Carson Electric Cooperative Solar and Hydrogen Project in Questa Continues to Move Forward in 2026

FUNDED: approximately $231 million secured January 2025 through the USDA Rural Utility Service New ERA program, supporting 104 MW of renewable energy capacity · storage specified as up to 41 hours of long-duration energy storage · the 50 MW solar facility is PROPOSED for Village ownership — a proposal, not an achieved fact · schedule of record: groundbreaking June 2026, hydrogen hub targeted operational Q2 2028 · KCEC identity: member-owned distribution cooperative formed 1944, ~30,000 members across Taos, Colfax and Rio Arriba counties · three sites — Questa, Taos, and Picuris — with Environmental Assessments submitted 25 November 2025

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Kit Carson Electric Cooperative

The Questa Hydrogen Project: A Bright Spot in Rural Economic and Energy Development (Federal Overview)

the original 2025 specification was up to 16 hours of storage — the first rung of a 16 h / 41 h / 50 h drift published concurrently · the dimensionally incoherent claim '104 megawatts of energy annually' that went to Congress and USDA · arsenic, copper and mercury released to surface and ground water by mining activity · the 'more than four million gallons every day' treatment figure — DESIGN CAPACITY presented as operating throughput

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Kit Carson Electric Cooperative

The Questa Hydrogen Project (project page and FAQ)

the live page states 'up to 50 hours' of storage while the press release states 41 hours and the federal overview states 16 hours — three numbers, no distinguishing label · the $231 million is a mixture of grants and low-interest loans whose split has never been published · $289 million economic impact on the FAQ versus $298 million on the same page — an internal inconsistency · the live FAQ still describes reclaimed water from the Superfund site or the Taos Valley reclamation facility — OUT OF DATE against the groundwater-well designation · the OSE impairment analysis found diverting up to 250 acre-feet per year would not adversely affect the aquifer — a NON-IMPAIRMENT CEILING, not a transfer · the superseded timeline 'construction 2025-2026, operations 2026 or 2027' still published alongside the Q2 2028 schedule

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Kit Carson Electric Cooperative

Facts about KCEC's Hydrogen Project (FAQ PDF)

the proponent's own account of curtailed public comment, attributed to a 2025 Federal Register notice limiting the role of public comment · the cooperative states it is obligated to comply with federal requirements governing the grant

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Kit Carson Electric Cooperative (COO Richard Martinez)

Invitation to Bid — Electrolyzer Equipment RFP

procurement was still OPEN in May 2026 — no electrolyzer had been selected · the RUS name of record is the Kit Carson Pathways Project, RUS Project No. NM 11 — a third project name for a third audience · the published RFP is a one-page invitation cover letter; the specifications remain unpublished

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Kit Carson Electric Cooperative

Invitation to Bid — Hydrogen Storage RFP (004)

storage RFP issued 7 May 2026 with proposals due 5 June 2026 — confirming the plant is FUNDED, not under construction · no equipment specifications published in the storage package either

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US Environmental Protection Agency

Superfund Site Profile — Chevron Questa Mine, Cleanup Activities

the mine operated intermittently from 1920 until 2014; open pit mining 1965-1983 · about 328 million tons of acid-generating waste rock in nine large waste rock piles · site footprint: 3 square miles of mine and mill, ~1.5 square miles of tailings impoundments · placed on the National Priorities List 16 September 2011; renamed from Molycorp after public comment · remediation is at 2 of 9 waste rock piles — the site is NOT remediated · the 275-acre cover is a PILOT to test whether 2 feet of cover is protective — the remedy itself is still an experiment

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US Environmental Protection Agency

Case Summary: $143 Million Cleanup Settlement for New Mexico Mine Site

the 9 August 2016 settlement with Chevron Mining Inc. requiring approximately $143 million in cleanup work · the work includes covering and revegetating ~275 acres, operating a water treatment plant, and installing groundwater extraction · Chevron Mining pays over $5.2 million to reimburse EPA past oversight costs · the responsible party is Chevron — the land the project sits on is leased, not owned

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US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement

Case Summary: $143 Million Settlement for Cleanup Work to Prevent Future Contamination of Red River in New Mexico

the consent decree was approved by the US District Court for the District of New Mexico on 1 May 2017 · over 328 million tons of acid-generating waste rock placed at the site · the remedy: cover ~275 acres of the tailings facility, operate a water treatment plant, install groundwater extraction systems

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US Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy

CX-032254: Kit Carson Electric Cooperative-Questa Green Hydrogen Project, NM — NEPA Determination

the DOE Congressionally Directed Spending award funds a STUDY of storage capacity, design and safety — not a build · all proposed activities are limited to deskwork studies, planning, analysis and design · no ground disturbance arises out of the DOE effort — do not conflate this funding stream with the USDA New ERA award

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US Department of Energy, NEPA

CX-032254, Kit Carson Electric Cooperative Questa Green Hydrogen Project (NM)

the public NEPA listing for the DOE study award at the former Molycorp Mine tailings site in the Village of Questa · funding type recorded as Congressionally Directed Spending

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Office of U.S. Senator Martin Heinrich

N.M. Delegation Welcomes $231 Million for Kit Carson Electric Cooperative's Green Hydrogen Project

the congressional-record version of the proponent claim set: $231 million New ERA, 104 megawatts, nearly 25,000 homes annually, 98,000 tons yearly · 'up to 350 construction jobs' and '$298 million in economic output' as PROPONENT statewide claims, not independent estimates · the $298 million figure traces to an unpublished study and must not be republished as fact · KCEC's own framing of member-owner control over the region's energy future

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CleanTechnica (Tina Casey)

Superfund Site Still On Track To Produce Green Hydrogen

water was initially to come from Chevron's Superfund wastewater treatment plants; Chevron instead designated a groundwater well — the regenerative claim's load-bearing sentence changed · the Village Council had still not voted on a power purchase agreement to buy the array · the plan spans Questa, the Town of Taos, and the Picuris Pueblo and Taos Pueblo tribes · the region is gripped by a 25-year megadrought · the project's own framing that the water right stays tied to the Questa community

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Albuquerque Journal

Questa hydrogen/solar facility set for June groundbreaking following year of uncertainty

Questa lost a key economic engine when the molybdenum mine, operated since 1920, closed permanently in 2014 · the 50 MW array is INTENDED to be community-owned, generating returns through power sales and tax revenues · independent restatement of the 41-hour storage spec, the $231 million award, and the June 2026 groundbreaking

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Questa News

Concerns Raised About Launching Questa Hydrogen Project

residents voiced concerns about whether the project could deplete local water resources and the aquifer · community members grew frustrated at the lack of clear direction on using the study for State Engineer review, and walked out of the meeting early · documented local objection is part of the record, not an externality

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IEEFA, hosted by We Own It

IEEFA Report on Kit Carson Leaving Tri-State

the cooperative's exit from Tri-State Generation and Transmission and the subsequent 10-year Guzman Energy contract · the widely repeated $37M exit fee — CONTESTED: contemporaneous 2016 reporting states the financial terms were not released · the '100% daytime solar by 2022' commitment whose true scope is daytime-only, sunny-days-only, and equal to ~34% of annual demand

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New Mexico Acequia Association (Paula Garcia, Harold Trujillo)

Report from the New Mexico Acequia Association to the Water and Natural Resources Legislative Interim Committee

an estimated 700 acequias in New Mexico functioning as local democratic institutions managing water for their parciantes · acequias were generally established between the early 1600s and 1800s and typically hold pre-1907 water rights · acequias are 'political subdivisions of the state' under Section 73-2-28 NMSA 1978 · New Mexico is unique in devoting two articles of state law, Chapter 72 Articles 2 and 3, to acequia governance · statutes authorize acequias to approve or deny water transfers

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New Mexico Acequia Association

Acequia Water Rights: Adjudication, Administration, and Water Sharing — presentation to the Land Grant Legislative Interim Committee

New Mexico adopted prior appropriation with the 1907 water code and established the State Engineer as water administrator · the Constitution recognized all pre-1907 water rights, including acequia-based rights · the repartimiento — customary water-sharing practice predating statehood and still practised informally · the State Engineer may administer by strict priority OR use 'alternative administration' including locally adapted water-sharing agreements · adjudication timescales: Aamodt filed 1966, settled 2013 · the Acequia and Community Ditch Fund has funded legal representation for hundreds of acequias for over 30 years

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New Mexico Acequia Association

Acequia Authority Over Water Transfers

since 2003 acequia communities can keep decision-making power over water transfers local · the acequia commission MAY DENY a transfer that would be detrimental to the acequia or its members · only if the acequia approves does the State Engineer then review the application — a real, sequenced community veto · jurisdiction is opt-in: the acequia must adopt the statutory requirement to hold it

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Hydrogen Europe

Hydrogen Production and Water Consumption (fact sheet)

stoichiometric floor: 1 kg of hydrogen requires 8.92 litres of water · electrolysis feedwater can come from any water resource — seawater, wastewater — once demineralised via reverse osmosis · desalination costs around EUR 0.8 per cubic metre, adding about EUR 0.007 per kg of hydrogen

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International Energy Agency

Global Hydrogen Review 2024

electrolysis requires about 10 litres of water per kg H2 for feedstock and 30-70 l/kg for feedstock and cooling together · around 40% of planned low-emissions hydrogen projects are in water-stressed regions · around half of announced 2030 electrolyser production sits in regions facing water stress · 50-55 kWh of electricity per kg H2 consumed by electrolysis · reverse-osmosis seawater desalination requires around 3-6 kWh per cubic metre · announced electrolysis projects amount to almost 520 GW of capacity — ANNOUNCED, not built

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RMI (Rocky Mountain Institute) — Ramirez, Weiss, Kirk, Gamage

Hydrogen Reality Check: Distilling Green Hydrogen's Water Consumption

9 litres of water per kg of hydrogen via electrolysis, plus an additional ~10-20 l/kg for purification and process cooling · cumulative 20-30 l/kg is on par with or less than the 20-40 l/kg required for fossil-based hydrogen · the honest framing: water intensity is a siting question, not a disqualifier

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Macknick, Newmark, Heath, Hallett — Environmental Research Letters 7(4) 045802

Operational water consumption and withdrawal factors for electricity generating technologies: a review of existing literature

median operational water consumption by technology (gal/MWh): PV 1, wind 0, NGCC-tower 205, nuclear-tower 672, coal-tower 687, CSP trough 906 · once-through cooling withdraws 10-100x more water per unit generation than cooling towers, yet towers can consume twice as much · the denominator for any 'is this draw material?' comparison against conventional generation

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Warwick, Griffiths, Keeble, Archibald, Pyle (Cambridge and NCAS) and Shine (Reading), for UK BEIS/DESNZ

Atmospheric implications of increased Hydrogen use

hydrogen GWP over a 100-year horizon estimated at 11 +/- 5 — more than 100% larger than previously published calculations · additional H2 emissions from leakage estimated at 9 and 96 Tg/yr at leakage rates of 1% and 10% · hydrogen leakage is a first-order climate variable, not a rounding error

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Sand, Skeie, Sandstad et al. — Communications Earth and Environment 4:203 (CICERO et al.)

A multi-model assessment of the Global Warming Potential of hydrogen

hydrogen GWP100 of 11.6 +/- 2.8 (one standard deviation) · hydrogen GWP20 of 37.3 +/- 15.1 — the near-term forcing is much larger · keeping hydrogen leakage at a minimum is required to realise the benefit of switching to hydrogen

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Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

ET48 — Power-to-Hydrogen-to-Power: Technology, Efficiency and Economics

round-trip efficiency by technology: internal combustion engines 27.4-33%, gas turbines 24-26.8%, fuel cells 27.4-48% · power-to-hydrogen-to-power is less economically advantageous than pumped hydro, CAES and batteries, largely due to lower round-trip efficiency · hydrogen boasts the highest energy density and exceptional potential for storing TWh of energy — the case for LONG-duration, not daily cycling · the honest efficiency denominator the Questa record never states for itself

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Ong, Campbell, Denholm, Margolis, Heath — NREL

Land-Use Requirements for Solar Power Plants in the United States (NREL/TP-6A20-56290)

total-area capacity-weighted average of 8.9 acres/MWac for utility-scale solar · direct land-use capacity-weighted average of 7.3 acres/MWac · the total-versus-direct distinction that any honest land ledger must publish separately

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Margery Ryan — Johnson Matthey

Recycling and thrifting: the answer to the iridium question in electrolyser growth

around 400 kg of iridium is required per GW of PEM electrolyser capacity · just 7-8 tonnes of iridium is mined each year worldwide — a hard materials ceiling on PEM scale-up · a 75% reduction in iridium intensity would still require 8-10 tonnes · closed-loop recycling within the same application is the industry's stated mitigation

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GET H2

By-Products of Electrolysis (factsheet)

a 100 MW electrolysis plant can produce around 60,000 tonnes of oxygen per year · 31 MW of thermal output as waste heat from a 100 MW plant · oxygen end-uses include steel, chemicals, refineries, sewage-treatment water purification and medical oxygen · whether waste-heat use is feasible must be assessed project by project — a disposition, not an automatic credit

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Cassol et al. — Nature Communications

Ultra-fast green hydrogen production from municipal wastewater by an integrated forward osmosis-alkaline water electrolysis system

hydrogen purity remained stably above 99% throughout long-term operation on wastewater effluent feed · 4.43 kWh/Nm3 at 0.95 A cell current using wastewater effluent as feed · forward-osmosis integration can cut water-treatment capital cost by up to 46% versus conventional RO · PILOT/laboratory evidence that reclaimed water is a technically real feedstock pathway — not yet an operating precedent at scale

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European Commission / EUR-Lex

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1184

the RFNBO temporal-correlation rule: from 1 January 2030 hydrogen must be produced in the SAME ONE-HOUR PERIOD as the renewable electricity · the geographic-correlation rule: the generator must be in the same bidding zone as the electrolyser · the additionality condition excluding generation that received operating or investment aid · the three pillars in binding law rather than in advocacy

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European Commission / EUR-Lex

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1184 (Articles 5 and 7, CELEX text)

the additionality 36-month rule: the renewable installation came into operation not earlier than 36 months before the hydrogen installation · the operative article text underlying the additionality pillar

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European Commission / EUR-Lex

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1185

the fossil fuel comparator of 94 gCO2eq/MJ for renewable fuels of non-biological origin · the denominator every RFNBO emissions-reduction threshold is computed against

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Cornell Legal Information Institute

26 U.S. Code Section 45V — Credit for production of clean hydrogen

the statutory begin-construction deadline: construction must begin before January 1, 2028 · the US production tax credit whose eligibility rules reshape project economics

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US Treasury / IRS, Federal Register

Credit for Production of Clean Hydrogen (final regulations, TD 10023)

lifecycle emissions must be determined using the latest publicly available 45VH2-GREET model developed by Argonne National Laboratory · the US chose a single mandated lifecycle model rather than a threshold-only regime

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Cornell Legal Information Institute

26 CFR Section 1.45V-4 — Procedures for determining lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions rates

an energy attribute certificate qualifies only if the electricity is generated in the SAME HOUR as hydrogen production · hourly matching as a codified US requirement, not a proposal

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Green Hydrogen Organisation (GH2)

The Green Hydrogen Standard — Requirements

the leading voluntary green-hydrogen standard requires 'informed consultation and participation with Indigenous peoples throughout the project process' · CONSULTATION, not free prior and informed consent — the gap this reference model is built to close · the benchmark a regenerative standard must exceed rather than restate

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CertifHy

GHG Emissions and Sustainability — CertifHy EU RFNBO Voluntary Scheme, V1.6

applying the 70% reduction requirement to the fossil comparator yields a threshold of 28.2 gCO2eq/MJ · the operative numeric emissions ceiling for EU RFNBO certification

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CertifHy

CertifHy Scheme Document — EU RFNBO Voluntary Scheme, V1.8

the scheme must apply for re-recognition by the European Commission every five years · certification governance is itself time-bounded and reviewable — a design precedent for a rising floor

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International Organization for Standardization

ISO/TS 19870:2023 — Methodology for determining the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production, conditioning and transport of hydrogen to consumption gate

the international technical specification provides a GHG assessment METHODOLOGY without setting thresholds for 'clean' or 'sustainable' · there is no global numeric definition of green hydrogen — jurisdictions set their own

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IPHE, Hydrogen Production Analysis Task Force

Methodology for Determining the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Associated with the Production of Hydrogen — Working Paper Ver 3

the intergovernmental methodology explicitly declines to propose GHG intensity threshold values, leaving them to each country · confirmation that the threshold gap is deliberate, not an oversight

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International Energy Agency

Towards hydrogen definitions based on their emissions intensity

an internationally agreed emissions accounting framework is the way to move away from colour-based terminology · colour labels have proved impractical for the contracts that underpin investment · 'green hydrogen' is a marketing category; emissions intensity is the measurable one

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W. Ricks, Q. Xu, J.D. Jenkins — Environmental Research Letters 18(1) 014025

Minimizing emissions from grid-based hydrogen production in the United States

without the three pillars it would always be more environmentally friendly to produce the same hydrogen by steam methane reforming than by grid-based electrolysis · the peer-reviewed basis for treating unconstrained grid electrolysis as a net harm

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Princeton University ZERO Lab (W. Ricks, J.D. Jenkins)

Comment to Treasury/IRS on the Section 45V Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

the three pillars are structurally interdependent: remove any one and the whole clean hydrogen house comes tumbling down · the origin of the 'three pillars' framing used across the model's pathway rungs

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Environmental Defense Fund

Three-pillar rule is essential to safely grow the U.S. clean hydrogen economy

without incrementality and hourly matching, hydrogen projects could have up to five times the emissions of today's gas-based hydrogen · the quantified downside case: emissions increases of up to 650 million tons CO2 equivalent through 2032

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R.W. Howarth and M.Z. Jacobson — Energy Science and Engineering 9:1676-1687

How green is blue hydrogen?

the greenhouse gas footprint of blue hydrogen is more than 20% greater than burning natural gas or coal for heat · why 'hydrogen hub' is not a synonym for green hydrogen

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Michael Liebreich

Hydrogen Ladder Version 5.0

the end-use merit order: there is essentially no role for hydrogen in heating · the discipline of naming which uses hydrogen is actually the right answer for

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International Energy Agency

Global Hydrogen Review 2025

low-emissions hydrogen production could reach 37 Mtpa by 2030, but only 4.2 Mtpa are OPERATIONAL, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, OR AT FID · the single cleanest statement of the announcement-to-delivery gap

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RWE

Energy Hub Lingen

OPERATING: a 14 MW pilot electrolysis plant — the largest verified operating electrolyser in this corpus · UNDER CONSTRUCTION: a 300 MW electrolysis plant targeted by 2027 · the reference case for what 'operating' actually looks like at this date

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RWE

RWE and TotalEnergies agree long-term offtake agreement for green hydrogen

a BINDING offtake: around 30,000 metric tons of green hydrogen per year from 2030 to 2044 · described as the largest quantity of climate-neutral hydrogen ever contracted from an electrolyser in Germany · the counter-example proving contracted demand is achievable — and is what almost every cancelled project lacked

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HIF Global

HIF Haru Oni

OPERATING: 130,000 litres/year e-gasoline, 1.2 MW electrolyzer capacity, 21 people · the world's most celebrated e-fuels plant runs on 1.2 MW

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Siemens Energy

A lighthouse project at the southern tip of Chile

ANNOUNCED: scaling to a projected 55 million litres/year by mid-decade, then 550 million litres/year · the announcement half of the anchor announcement-versus-delivery pair — 550,000,000 announced against 130,000 delivered

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Mongabay Latam (Barinia Montoya)

Chile en la encrucijada del hidrogeno verde

68 green hydrogen projects identified across Chile, of which 47 are 'proyectos de papel' — paper projects · no projects operate anywhere in the world at the scale proposed in Magallanes

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Energy Transition Africa

Africa's Green Hydrogen Pipeline Has Almost No Final Investment Decisions

of 17 GW of announced electrolyser capacity targeting 2030, 2 percent has reached final investment decision · Project AMAN in Mauritania was suspended in June 2025 after the developer could not secure long-term offtake

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Stanwell Corporation / ARENA

CQ-H2 Public FEED Summary Report

CANCELLED: the project was discontinued in June 2025 · cause of death: securing an offtaker during FEED was the key challenge, offtakers being unwilling to commit financially during development · an Indigenous Land Use Agreement and Cultural Heritage Management Agreement were 'well-advanced' and NEITHER WAS EVER EXECUTED · 'secured land' meant an agreement to purchase the site only in the event the project proceeded — an option, not tenure

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NortH2

NortH2 rondt de studiefase af

DORMANT: the consortium's last published news item is 22 December 2022 and promises only an organisational structure · 0 MW built, no cancellation ever announced — this row is retained as a dormancy record only; the '10 GW-by-2040' figure quoted elsewhere in circulation traces to the original 2020 launch announcement, not to this source, and no citation in this register resolves that figure

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Topsoe

Topsoe adjusts SOEC commercialization pathway to match market outlook

the electrolyser factory will be hibernated until demand is robust; a planned second US factory will not proceed · around 440 roles affected and a one-off restructuring cost of DKK 3,500-3,900 million · cause: slower than expected development in targeted clean hydrogen markets

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Air Products

Air Products to Exit Three U.S.-Based Projects

the Massena green liquid hydrogen facility was cancelled because regulatory developments rendered existing hydroelectric supply ineligible for the 45V credit · a pre-tax charge not to exceed $3.1 billion · evidence that additionality rules bind hard against EXISTING clean generation — directly relevant to a co-op building new solar

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Investing.com, reporting thyssenkrupp nucera results

thyssenkrupp nucera Q3 2025/26 results: chlor-alkali strength, green hydrogen pivot

green hydrogen revenue fell to EUR 36 million from EUR 103 million year on year while chlor-alkali grew 34% · an order backlog of EUR 638 million with approximately 3.5 GW of green hydrogen projects in execution · currency backlog, not nameplate GW, is the honest sector-activity indicator

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Nel ASA

Nel ASA: Second quarter 2026 financial results

quarterly revenue of NOK 153 million against an order backlog of NOK 1,213 million and EBITDA of NOK -155 million · order intake up 224% year on year — a genuinely mixed signal, reported as mixed · the electrolyser supply chain is financially stressed, not absent

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First Nations Clean Energy Network

First Nations co-ownership and equity participation in clean energy projects

'The purest form of consent is equity. You can never argue you're not getting consent if you're an equity partner and in a position where you have some say in how the project would be built.' · the discipline attached: shareholder equity is what remains after debt — equity RANKS BEHIND DEBT · equity arrangements remain relatively rare — so this is a design target, not a description of practice

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First Nations Clean Energy Network

Best Practice Principles for Clean Energy Projects

the operative FPIC definition: consent means the opportunity to approve OR REJECT projects before commencement, or withdraw or reconsider consent if the proposed activities change · the standard against which 'informed consultation' is measured and found short

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NTSCORP

Native Title And Future Acts

the right to negotiate is one of the strongest procedural rights under the Native Title Act · and it 'does not give native title parties the power to veto or say no to the future act being done' · the clearest statement that the most elaborate consent machinery on earth is not consent

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Queensland South Native Title Services

Policies and Procedures, Part 11 Div 3 Native Title Act

once registered, an Indigenous Land Use Agreement binds not only the parties but ALL native title holders for that area · registration converts a negotiated commercial agreement into a statutory instrument binding people who never signed it

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Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation

Submission to the ALRC Review of the Future Acts Regime

a party that does not want a project to proceed is still required to negotiate in good faith about it · a ruling in favour of the native title party only brings the proponent to the table — it does not stop the act · the principle to adopt outright: the onus is on the State and proponent to establish why the act should be done, not on the native title party to establish why it should not

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Australian Law Reform Commission

Fulfilling the Promise of Mabo

the future acts regime 'generally fails to provide the fundamental protections afforded to other property rights holders' · Recommendation 2 seeks standards that promote obtaining free, prior and informed consent to a future act agreement · the law is mid-reform and the reform is about consent — a rising regulatory floor, cited as REGULATORY not operating

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Western Green Energy Hub

MIRNING

a significant minority shareholding of 10 per cent with no financial contribution required until the project is approved · a permanent seat on the WGEH Pty Ltd Board · the developer-side statement of the equity structure, PRE-FID

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First Nations Clean Energy Network

Western Green Energy Hub case study

the 10% stake is a FREE CARRIED INTEREST through to Final Investment Decision only · after FID the holder must contribute project costs to retain shares, or sell some or all of them — carried is not owned · the project can only go ahead with an Indigenous Land Use Agreement in place, and none is executed

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Murchison Green Hydrogen (Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners)

Informational Resources

engagement with the Nanda Aboriginal Corporation since 2021 to develop an Indigenous Land Use Agreement — still not executed five years on · potential exclusion zones within the development envelope are still being determined · every public statement about the affected people is the proponent speaking about them

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EverWind Fuels

Point Tupper Green Fuels Project

the best-structured consent instrument in the corpus: a 2025 Memorandum of Agreement with the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi'kmaw Chiefs representing all 13 Mi'kmaq First Nations · negotiating at the level of the nation prevents a developer shopping for the most agreeable counterparty · the honest limit: the MOA establishes a PATH TOWARD a benefits agreement that is not yet signed · water was studied before it was committed — a finalized water supply agreement plus bathymetric survey and safe yield analysis of Landrie Lake · PRE-FID: construction targeted to begin 2027; approximately 200,000 tonnes of green ammonia per year · the sobering jobs arithmetic: 20-35 permanent local operations and support jobs

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EverWind Fuels

Kmtnuk Wind Project

a QUANTIFIED community benefits agreement: ~$4 million/yr in municipal taxes compounding to over $170 million over project life · volunteer contributions of $1,000 per MW to a community benefits fund · a Mi'kmaq Ecological Knowledge Study treated as an assessment input alongside geotechnical and wetland work · ~7 permanent local operations jobs from a 128 MW wind project — green hydrogen is not an employment programme · the project is named from the Mi'kmaq word Kmtnuk, 'Where the Mountain is'

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CBC News (Patrick Butler)

Tensions high on Port au Port Peninsula over wind-hydrogen megaproject

the engagement targeted the wrong governance units — local service districts encompassing most residents were not included · a benefit fund pointed at communities that are not incorporated and have no employees is not a benefit instrument · cost and benefit landed in different places: turbines on the peninsula, permanent jobs at the plant elsewhere · resident testimony: 'I feel personally like my voice doesn't count' · the generalisable diagnosis: communities dislike feeling the decision was already made, and that removes any chance of building trust

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CBC News (Butler and Cooke)

John Risley calls time of death on green hydrogen plans

CANCELLED: a massive wind-to-hydrogen project in western Newfoundland will not go ahead · the replacement proposal is judged more feasible because it has a buyer — which hydrogen never had · what the community is left with after cancellation: no plant, no jobs, no fund, and the engagement record

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World Energy GH2

Community

a Memorandum of Understanding with Qalipu First Nation and a commitment to Truth and Reconciliation Call to Action 92 · equity or ownership for communities is NOT PRESENT anywhere on the developer's own community page · the difference an MOU makes, and the difference it does not

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Daures Green Hydrogen Village (DGHV)

Daures Green Hydrogen Village

PILOT BUILT: the only project in the corpus where the molecule stays home — output is fertiliser for local agriculture · the consent instrument is a partnership with the Daure Daman Traditional Authority and the Tsiseb Conservancy · measured local benefit: 376 Namibians and 23 small and medium enterprises employed during construction · context: over 80% of residents survive on under 1 US$ per day · the counter-model to export-oriented gigawatt projects, at pilot scale and honestly labelled

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Hyphen Hydrogen Energy

The Hyphen Project

PRE-FID: a ~4,000 km2 concession inside the Tsau Khaeb National Park, around Luderitz and Aus · Phase 1 stated as 3.75 GW renewable and 1.5 GW electrolyser — the co-owner publishes 3.5 GW for the same phase · benefit commitments are ESTIMATES, not obligations: 15,000 construction jobs with an estimated 90% Namibian · no penalty, audit or enforcement mechanism appears in any fetched source

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ENERTRAG

Hyphen: Project for green hydrogen in Namibia

the Namibian government holds 24% of share capital through SDG Namibia One — equity held by the SOVEREIGN, not by any affected community · the developer's claim of 'ongoing consultations with communities, including the Nama Traditional Leaders Association' · the two co-owners publish different Phase 1 capacities for the same project

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European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR)

From Empire to Energy Imperialism: Germany's Colonial Legacy and 'Green' Projects in Namaqualand

the same 4,000 km2 is ancestral land of the Nama people · Nama tribal communities 'have not received adequate information' and have not 'been consulted or given the opportunity to express their consent or objection' · the developer's consultation claim and the consulted party's own public position are irreconcilable on the fetched record

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Africa-Press Namibia (Dalene Kooper)

'Hands off Shark Island'

the Nama Traditional Leaders Association coordinator, in his own words: 'Stop and engage the Nama and Ovaherero people. Sit down and listen to what the affected communities want.' · 'Shark Island is a living cemetery' — heritage that a port expansion serving the project puts at risk · a body cannot simultaneously be consulted on an ongoing basis and be publicly demanding that consultation begin

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African Arguments (Grobler, Lo and Civillini)

Namibia's $10bn green hydrogen project raises myriad concerns

most of the developer's public meetings took place in a regional capital 350 km away — consultation geography as an exclusion mechanism · 'There is just no public discussion about the benefits for ordinary people like me, or what price we are to pay'

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Afrobarometer (Mpako and Ndoma)

AD849: Namibians grow more dissatisfied with government's efforts on electricity provision

fewer than four in 10 Namibians (37%) enjoy a reliable supply of electricity, including just 19% of rural residents · fewer than half (48%) live in grid-connected households · the export question stated as a measurement: who gets the electricity, and who does not have any

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US Department of Energy / OCED

Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs FOA DE-FOA-0002779

the Community Benefits Plan is worth 20% of the merit score — Criterion 5 · engagement must occur 'in a manner that can impact project decisions' · DOE only initially authorizes funding for Phase 1 — no hub has passed Phase 1

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US Department of Energy

FAQ: Community Benefits Agreements

a community benefits agreement IS a legally enforceable contract · but DOE is not a party to community benefits projects · and what enters the award is 'the commitment to negotiate and execute a community benefits agreement (not the agreement itself)' · the hole, written down by the agency: communities have no cause of action

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US Department of Energy / OCED

OCED Community Benefits Plan 101 Factsheet

the four CBP pillars: engaging communities and labor, investing in the workforce, advancing DEIA, and implementing Justice40 · the Justice40 target that at least 40% of overall benefits accrue to disadvantaged communities

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US Department of Energy / OCED

ARCH2 Community Benefits Commitments Summary

the one real governance transfer: the Advisory Board chair holds one voting seat on the hub's executive board · everything else is deferred — by-laws 'will be finalized in Phase 1', a CBA pursued only 'if desired by the local community' · across the published commitments summary for a $925m hub there is no dollar figure, no numeric target, no date, and no executed agreement

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Earthjustice

The Federal Hydrogen Hub Program

on 28 January 2025 DOE published a memo instructing recipients to 'cease any activities' associated with Community Benefits Plans · 'hydrogen hub' is not a synonym for green hydrogen — ARCH2 uses fossil fuels with carbon capture for seven of ten production facilities · rights anchored only in federal grant conditions have the half-life of an administration

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Earthjustice

Tools for Communities: Federal Hydrogen Hub Community Guide

the enforceability test, stated precisely: a commitment is legally enforceable when a community, DOE, or another oversight authority can take legal action to remedy non-compliance · released commitment summaries 'are very high level'

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Corporate Europe Observatory

The scramble for hydrogen in South Africa

'there has been no free, prior and informed consent on the ground, and their experiences are completely missing from the European hydrogen policy debate' · affected residents in their own words: 'We are scared we are going to lose our land'

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Western Sahara Resource Watch

Morocco pushes enormous green hydrogen plans in occupied Western Sahara

about three-quarters of the land made available under the Morocco Offer is not in Morocco but in occupied Western Sahara · the Saharawis have not consented to the use of their land and resources · the extreme case: a consent failure that is also a legal one

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African Arguments (Saber Ammar, Transnational Institute)

Green hydrogen: Africa is not Europe's battery

'Our priority is to provide cheap green electricity to the 600 million people currently lacking access to it, rather than rushing to produce green hydrogen for Europe' · the charge that value chains are dominated at the centre while socio-environmental costs are externalised to the periphery

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Coalition for Human Rights in Development

The dark side of green hydrogen and community resistance in Chile and Uruguay

'The company is providing water consumption figures, but constantly changing its discourse' · permanent jobs described as highly specialized workers, mostly external · documented social harms including gender-based violence and the masculinization of territories

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Land Conflict Watch

Pastoral community in Banni demands titles recognising Community Forest Rights

in 2015, 47 villages under 16 gram panchayats were granted Community Forest Rights over the entire 2,500 km2 of the Banni grasslands · the pattern to name: an existing collective land right being routed around rather than negotiated with

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Mongabay India (Manish Kumar)

Water is needed for green hydrogen production, but concerns remain

nine litres of water per kilogram of green hydrogen produced · 'There is a mismatch in RE potential sites and water availability' — the siting conflict stated as a structural fact

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US Environmental Protection Agency

Alternative Energy at Superfund Sites

OPERATING: in 2024, 161 alternative energy installations at 110 Superfund sites with an installed capacity of 1,988 megawatts · the precedent class for energy on contaminated land is real and measured, not hypothetical

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US Environmental Protection Agency

RE-Powering Benefits

benefits documented for 491 renewable energy projects on contaminated land · nearly 14% of projects report job creation — the honest employment share · EPA's own caveat: a cumulative expression of total benefits is not possible from publicly available sources

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US EPA and NREL

Best Practices for Siting Solar Photovoltaics on Municipal Solid Waste Landfills

over 190,000 formerly contaminated lands, landfills and mine sites screened, covering nearly 44 million acres · the engineering constraint set for building on a cap: ballasted foundations, no cap penetration, no regrading, above-ground conduit, differential settlement · post-closure care obligations run 30 years after closure · the equity context: more than 1 in 4 Black and Hispanic Americans live within three miles of a Superfund site · community-benefit precedents with numbers attached: guaranteed bill savings for low- and moderate-income subscribers, 70% of output earmarked for nonprofit and low-income customers

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RENEW Wisconsin

When the Plug Is Already In the Wall

projects that reuse an existing connection point can often be built in two to three years · the interconnection asset an extraction site leaves behind is the reusable inheritance

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Canary Media

Why Illinois has struggled to turn old coal sites into solar farms

the repurposing thesis under-delivered: 294 MW planned became 164 MW built, and no stand-alone storage · securing grid interconnection was expensive and time-consuming even when reusing existing transmission · toxic coal ash made much of the site unbuildable — contamination constrains reuse in practice

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US Department of Energy, Office of Policy

Repurposing Retired Coal Plants for Our Energy Future

retired plants carry transferable value: transportation access and an existing point of interconnection · the existing workforce is largely transferable, with workers aligned in skillsets

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The Australia Institute

Community-owned wind: Lessons from Denmark

OPERATING/REGULATORY precedent: under the 2008 Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, new renewable projects must offer at least 20% ownership to local residents · in 2016 more than half of Denmark's installed wind capacity was owned by citizens · Middelgrunden has been 50% owned by 10,000 cooperative members since 2001, returning about 7.5% after depreciation · proof that mandated local ownership is a working regulatory instrument, not an aspiration

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RES Group

Wataynikaneyap Transmission Project — case study

OPERATING precedent for majority Indigenous ownership: 24 First Nations retain a controlling 51 percent share through Watay Power · a $1.9 billion, 1,800 km project — controlling ownership at infrastructure scale is achievable

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Institute for Fiscal Studies — Rud, Simmons, Toews, Aragon

Job displacement costs of phasing out coal (IFS Working Paper 22/37)

wages fall by 40% and earnings by 80-90% one year after job loss, and remain significantly depressed fifteen years later · present-value earnings losses of four to six times pre-displacement earnings · remote single-employer regions absorb displaced workers worst — the exact profile of a mine-closure village · the measured size of the wound a 'just transition' claims to heal

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US Government Accountability Office

GAO-11-834T — Abandoned Mines: Information on the Number of Hardrock Mines, Cost of Cleanup, and Value of Financial Assurances

at least 161,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites across 12 western states and Alaska; at least 33,000 had degraded the environment · financial assurances for 52 reviewed operations were about $61 million SHORT of estimated reclamation costs · the scale of the inherited liability, and the fact that assurances routinely under-cover it

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Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law — Hein, Snow, Stefanik, Webb

Self-Bonding in an Era of Coal Bankruptcy: Recommendations for Reform

outstanding self-bond obligations totalled $3.86 billion nationwide, of which $2.4 billion was held by companies then in bankruptcy · a bond must be sufficient to complete the reclamation plan if the regulator had to perform the work · existing rules ignore parent-subsidiary structures and are not re-evaluated frequently enough · why a decommissioning obligation must be a funded instrument, not a promise

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Holland and Knight

IRS Releases 2026 Energy Community Bonus Credit Updates for Statistical Areas and Coal Closures

REGULATORY: the energy community bonus increases Sections 45, 48, 45Y and 48E credits by 10 percent, reduced if prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements are unmet · qualifying criteria include census tracts where a coal mine closed after 1999 or a generating unit retired after 2009 · an existing federal instrument that already pays a premium for building where extraction ended

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Use the model

Read the basin before you pick the site

Exploration is open. Building and representing conformance are licensed. The first task is not a capacity number; it is naming the basin, the people who already hold a right to refuse, and what has to be measured before anything is applied for.